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Abstract
This paper is intended to honour the memory of Douglas Walton (1942–2020),
a Canadian philosopher of argumentation who died in January 2020. Walton’s
contributions to argumentation theory have had a very strong influence on Arti-
ficial Intelligence (ai), particularly in the design of autonomous software agents
able to reason and argue with one another, and in the design of protocols to
govern such interactions. In this paper, we explore two of these contributions
— argumentation schemes and dialogue protocols — by discussing how they
may be applied to a pressing current research challenge in ai: the automated
assessment of explanations for automated decision-making systems.
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1 Introduction
Both of us, along with many researchers in artificial intelligence (ai), especially
those working on computational models of argumentation and multiagent systems,
have been greatly influenced by the work of Doug Walton. At the end of this paper
(see Section 5) we will say a little about this from a personal perspective, but we
want to spend the bulk of this paper exploring why we think Doug’s work has
been so influential. In short, it is because two aspects of his work — the work on
dialogue protocols, exemplified by [62], and that on argument schemes, exemplified
by [61] — provide a basis1 for a solution to some of the major problems in artificial
intelligence.2 We will illustrate this by taking one such problem — the need to
provide explanations for the reasoning performed by ai systems — and showing
how Doug’s work provides an underpinning for a possible solution. We start with
this problem, and why it has become a prominent problem.
1.1 Why explanations are necessary
The third edition3 of Russell and Norvig’s “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Ap-
proach”, published in 2009, includes a history of ai from its birth (which they date
to 1956, at the Dartmouth workshop, though acknowledging that work on ai was
done before this point) to the time of writing. The period from 2001 is headed “The
availability of very large datasets”, and points to the ability of systems bootstrap
from large collections of data as possibly leading to ai systems that no longer need
the careful knowledge engineering that was previously necessary. The subsequent
decade has seen this prediction, if not borne out4, at least extensively tested, with
impressive results on a range of applications.
Much of this success has been due to techniques from deep learning, that is
techniques that make use of neural networks with many layers. These methods
were coming into their own while Russell and Norvig were putting the third edition
1The use of the indefinite article is deliberate here. There are undoubtedly other solutions which
would have other bases. However, that does not undermine the importance of that based on Doug’s
work.
2At the end of writing this paper we discovered another tribute to Doug Walton that focuses
on the same two of his contributions, this time in the area of ai and law, namely [7].
3Though a fourth edition was published in early 2020, it is not yet easily available in the UK
at the time of writing.
4It is noteworthy that much of the recent cutting-edge work on machine learning has been
looking at ways to incorporate engineered knowledge into the learning process, suggesting that
researchers in machine learning are beginning to feel that there are limitations to the idea of
extracting all that is needed to solve every problem directly from data.
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together5, and have come to dominate work on machine learning and ai. Indeed, for
many outside the field of ai, and a good number of those within who have graduated
in the last few years, machine learning is ai, and the only kind of machine learning
worth considering is deep learning. While the performance of deep learning systems
is extremely impressive, there are a number of (well-known) issues that widespread
use of such systems raises. Chief among these6 is the fact that it is frequently
obscure why a deep model gives a specific answer. This is in contrast to earlier ai
methods — for example the rule-based methods of expert systems, or the causal
probabilistic networks that led to the previous wave of ai applications — where it is
straightforward to extract a trace of the reasoning that led to a conclusion and one
could pose “what if?” questions about related situations. It is in contrast to other
machine learning methods, for example decision trees, where structural information
about a domain can be extracted from the model that has been learnt.
The reason that this is significant is because, as ai applications become more
widespread, there will be an increasing need to be able to explain not just what
decisions were reached, but how those decisions were reached. In other words, there
is a requirement for ai to be explainable. This requirement is driven by regulatory
pressure. For example, gdpr7 regulation in the eu, requires that organisations that
use ai systems to make decisions
shall implement suitable measures to safeguard [the subject of those de-
cision]’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to
obtain human intervention on the part of the [organisation making the
decision], to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.
This is widely understood to mean that decisions made by those ai systems must
be such that that can be explained to the subject of those decisions, since how
5In [26], three of the pioneers of deep learning date the breakthrough in such methods to 2009
for speech recognition and 2012 for image processing.
6Two others, in passing, are the following. (1) the fact that deep learning not only benefits from
huge amounts of data, but requires it. As a result, if you work in a domain that does not have tens
of thousands of examples that your system can learn from, you will not be able to create robust
models. Unfortunately, areas like medicine fall into this category. Another example is the creation of
software for control of autonomous ships, where there is a severe lack of publicly-accessible data on
collisions. Nowadays there are very few collisions between large ships; there are many more near-
collisions, but most of these are not reported outside the companies involved. (2) training deep
models uses a large amount of power, and since the methodology for learning the hyper-parameters
that determine whether or not a particular model is effective is basically brute-force search, training
a good model is very energy inefficient. In a climate emergency, one might question the morality of




else would that subject be able to express their views and contest the result in any
meaningful way?
Similarly, the European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II
(mifid ii8), which came into force in January 2018, requires companies which provide
financial information or services in which wholly automated decision have material
impacts on individuals or on small and medium-sized enterprises to provide those
impacted with human-understandable explanations of how the automated decisions
have been made9. Indeed, the policy statement from the European Commission
to the European Parliament relating to ai (published in April 2018) emphasizes
Explainable ai as a key area of research and innovation for the next eu Multiannual
Financial Framework (2021–2027), along with the areas of unsupervised machine
learning and energy and data efficiency.10
These regulatory pressures are also present elsewhere in the world. For example,
in January 2019 the Personal Data Protection Commission (pdpc), a Government
agency in Singapore, released a draft model framework for the Governance of ai
systems in large organizations and enterprises [1]. After public consultation during
2019, a revised version was released in January 2020. The framework is a voluntary
collection of ethical principles and governance considerations that are recommended
by the pdpc for adoption by organizations; the Framework is not legally binding.
The Model Framework proposes two high-level guiding principles for design and
deployment of ai applications:
• Organizations using ai in decision-making should ensure that the decision-
making process is explainable, transparent and fair; and
• Applications of ai should be human-centric.
The Singapore Model Framework also provides guidance on when and how applica-
tions of ai should incorporate human involvement in decision-making processes.
This section has discussed the pressures from Governments and industry regula-
tors on adopters of automated decision-making systems to ensure that these systems
explain their decisions. Another pressure will likely come from the legal system. If a
8https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir/
9Legal or regulatory requirements to provide explanations for decisions reached by automated
systems have led some people to propose inserting a dumb human into the decision process so that
the process no longer appears completely automated. However, if the human only ever approved
the decisions and never rejected them, then it is unlikely that European courts would accept such
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human car driver is faced with an untenable choice, for example driving straight on
and thereby hitting an oncoming car or swerving off the road and hitting a pedes-
trian, and if there is a subsequent legal case, judges and juries may well accept (as
they do now) an explanation from the driver along the lines of, “I was faced with an
impossible choice, and in the heat of the moment I chose one way rather than the
other.”.
However, if the car in question is an autonomous vehicle, that response will most
likely not be acceptable to courts. Instead, courts will want to ask how that trade-
off was made by the vehicle in that moment. Was it pre-coded? If so, how did
the software developers make that pre-coded decision? If not, how did the software
developers allow the machine to decide itself between the two options (e.g., did it
make a random choice?). Courts may well also probe what ethical considerations the
developers considered before coding the vehicle. What ethical training had they had
before considering any ethical issues? What directives or ethical advice, and from
whom, had they received beforehand? Etc. Such probative questioning by courts
will not stop at the first response as with a human driver. Hence, we expect the
legal system’s response to cases concerning accidents involving autonomous vehicles
to add further pressures on developers of ai systems to provide explanations of the
decisions made or recommended by those systems.
1.2 Fairness and explanation
Note that this desire for ai systems to be explainable, is related to concerns about the
fairness of ai and, more broadly, what is known as algorithmic decision making11.
11The term “algorithmic decision making” is used to refer to situations in which decisions are
made by a system that involves software with no human oversight or involvement. Clearly decisions
made by a software system that uses ai and which has no human oversight or involvement are
a subset of those reached using algorithmic decision making. In our view, “algorithmic decision
making” is a bad piece of terminology, since it is perfectly possible for a human to follow an
algorithm as part of making a decision in such a way that they exercise no free will, making the
decision determined purely by the process encoded in the algorithm. In other words, the use of the
term “algoithmic” does not imply the use of software, or the exclusion of a human from the process.
One of us (SP) remembers making decisions in exactly this way when he worked in a temporary
position at a Job Centre in the summer of 1988. One of the parts of the job was reviewing the
record of people receiving unemployment benefit and, provided that they met some criteria to do
with the length of time they had been out of work, inviting them for an interview. (“Inviting”, in
this case, meaning “threatening them with a loss of benefits if they did not attend”.) The process
was as mechanical as described — we were not allowed to exercise judgement, and what we did
could easily have been carried out by software. We suspect that the reason that such a poor term
as “algorithmic decision making” has come into use is a combination of its euphony (much better
than “software decision making” or “computerised decision making”) and the fact that many people
do not know the difference between an algorithm (the process itself) and its implementation.
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The concern is that whenever software is used with no human intervention, there is
the possibility for it to produce results that are biased, in the sense of discriminating
against individuals. Of course decisions involving humans can also be biased if the
humans are biased, but part of the concern with software decisions is that they can
be unscrutable (and so be hard to identify and rectify) and that they can exist even
when the software designers and deployers have no intention of being biased12.
Two well-known cases are the admissions process for students at St George’s
Hospital Medical School in London, and the compas recidivism risk calculator. In
the case of St George’s [28], the medical school created a piece of software to screen
applications for places to train to be a doctor. There were two aims. First, they
wanted to ensure that all applicants were treated the same, something that can
clearly not be the case when decisions are reached by humans (especially when the
decisions are distributed across a group). Second, they wanted to reduce the load
on their staff. The medical school was heavily over-subscribed (with 12 applicants
for each place in 1988), and the idea was to have the software screen out some ap-
plicants so that the admissions team had less applications to consider. The system
was carefully designed and then tuned until it had close agreement with the manual
process. Unfortunately, the manual process was itself flawed, and the software sys-
tem was found to be discriminatory, with an investigation by the Commission for
Racial Equality finding that:
as many as 60 applicants each year among 2000 may have been refused
an interview purely because of their sex or racial origin. [28]
compas, is a software system developed by Northpointe Inc. to help assess the
risk that, on the basis of their history, an individual would reoffend. The performance
of the system was analysed by ProPublica [4, 25] and found to exhibit racial bias.
The analysis considered more than 10,000 real cases from one county in Florida, and
compared the rate of recidivism predicted by the compas software against what the
individual actually did in the next two years. The headline finding was that:
Black defendants were often predicted to be at a higher risk of recidivism
than they actually were. Our analysis found that black defendants who
did not recidivate over a two-year period were nearly twice as likely to
12Note that it is possible for bias to exist not only in the data used for training purposes or
as inputs to some software analysis procedure, but even in the underlying conceptual abstractions
that allow the data to be recognized as data and thus enable its collection; for an example, see
[19]. Econometricians analyzing national accounts data face similar issues, for example, when the
definition of employment ignores unpaid work done by family members within households or on
farms.
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be misclassified as higher risk compared to their white counterparts (45
percent vs. 23 percent). [25]
In both these cases, the software system making decisions does so in a way
that is biased. In the case of the admissions system, the software was designed
to replicate an existing decision process that was already biased. In the case of
the recidivism system, the designers apparently [3] tuned the system to ensure that
its accuracy was the same for both black and white individuals — they assumed
that doing this would make its decision fair. However, as above this turned out
not to be the case for some reasonable definitions of “fair”, in particular the one
alluded to in the quotation above, that the rate at which defendants were wrongly
classified as higher risk should be the same regardless of whether the defendant
was black or white. Subsequent analysis [3] has shown that it is impossible for
both these notions of fairness — that the accuracy of predictions do not vary by
race, and that there is no disparity in incorrect misclassification as higher risk — to
be simultaneously satisfied. Indeed, aiming for equal accuracy of predictions leads
directly to a disparity in misclassification to a higher risk category. Such concerns
about the fairness of ai lead back to the desire for ai to be explainable because if
one can check the reasoning that an ai system uses, then it will be possible to check
that reasoning for bias [64].13
1.3 Explainable AI
The last few years has seen a surge in work on explainable ai, or xai. Much of
this work has centred around creating explanations for machine learning models,
especially those that look to many users like “black boxes”, in other words inscrutable
oracles that are inherently impossible for people to understand. A typical approach
is to take a black box model and train another model that is easier to understand
on the same data, and use that second model to explain the decisions made by
the first. This is the thrust of [16], which creates an ensemble of decision trees as
an explanation of a, more complex, deep neural network model. Another take on
the same issue is to explain a decision by plotting out the local area around the
point where the decision needs to be made and creating a model of that [43]. The
intuition here is that the inscrutability of models — that they consist of complex
multi-dimensional surfaces separating different outcomes — will often not exist at a
local level, allowing simple, and hence easy to understand, rules to be identified that
explain the decision. A criticism of this work, and much of the other efforts in xai is
13Of course, this is not the only way to ensure fairness, and much of the work on the fairness of
ai systems does not attempt to do this through explainability.
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that they are developed by the same people who build the black box models in the
first place, start from the thing to be explained, and create a solution by simplifying
it. This is a process that takes very little account of what the people who want the
explanations would find helpful [39].
Miller’s [39] examination of the literature on explanation, follows [23], among
others, in suggesting that many explanations presented by people focus on describ-
ing the underlying causal mechanisms, and, further [24], that these explanations
are presented in the form of a conversation. As [39] discusses, [5] goes further
in suggesting that explanations are presented not just as conversation, but as ar-
guments, in the sense of the provision of justifications for the assertions that are
made. The research in [5] is drawn from the analysis of a number of explanations
from human conversations — that is where one person explains something to an-
other. Given this, admittedly rather limited14, evidence, it seems plausible that
an argumentation-based approach to explanation will be a promising approach for
adoption by ai systems. Below, we sketch some requirements for computer-based
explanations, giving a first-principles analysis to complement the discussion above,
and the point to ways in which Doug Walton’s work can be used to underpin these
requirements.
2 Asking for and assessing explanations
2.1 What do we need for computer-based explanations?
What would we require in order to have automated explanations? A first require-
ment — and challenge — would be to generated explanations automatically for ai
decision systems. As mentioned above, for some types of ai systems, such rule-based
expert systems and causal probabilistic networks, automatically generating expla-
nations is straightforward, by generating a trace of the reasoning undertaken by the
system in reaching a conclusion.
For other types of ai systems, especially those which operate at a low level of
granularity, such as image classification programs analyzing individual pixels and
their neighbourhoods, this is not necessarily at all straightforward. Why automated
generation of explanations for such systems is difficult is because the level of op-
eration of the ai system is at lower level of the objects being classified than any
level containing human meaning. For a human being recognizing images of faces for
example, parts of the face are arguably very important to recognition and classifica-
tion, for example, colour of hair, shape of hairline, size of ears, presence or absence
14As [5] explain, their analysis is based on 30 examples of explanation, but they are from a single
conversation, itself taken from [51]
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of a beard, etc.15 Such parts have human meaning and can be readily described to
other humans as the reason for a particular classification. If, instead, an ai system
uses lower-level elements of images, such as individual pixels, or the relationships
between nearby pixels (eg, identifying edges by means of observed differences in pixel
colours) for facial recognition or classification, then these lower levels will typically
have no human-understandable meaning. It is generally not obvious how the use
of such lower-level elements could be aggregated or assembled automatically into
a higher-level explanation able to be understood by a human. Thus, automated
generation of explanations is difficult challenge for these types of ai systems.
In this paper, however, we will ignore the challenges involved in the generation of
explanations. Our focus will be on assessment of an explanation that has somehow
been produced, by automated means or manually. Given that an explanation has
been created, what is needed for its automated assessment by some entity seeking
to obtain an explanation for a decision of an ai system? Based on human-to-human
explanations, we might expect any machine assessment to have several features.
The first feature is a means for the formal representation of explanations, where
by “formal”, we mean machine-readable. This is necessary for automated parsing of
the explanation, as the first stage in a process of automated analysis and assessment,
and possibly also automated comparison with alternative arguments. As mentioned
above, this process is well-known and straightforward in cases where explanations
may be constructed from sequences of syllogistic or mathematical deduction (as in
rule-based Expert Systems) or from sequences of causal influences between time-
ordered events (as in Bayesian Belief Networks). Automated parsing and reasoning
over such explanations is routine in ai and in Computer Science16. However, there
are many other types of inference besides logical deduction and other types of ex-
planation besides sequences of causes and effects. It behooves us therefore to seek
more general formalisms for representing explanations.
2.2 The role of argument schemes
One such generalization are argumentation schemes with critical questions. Doug
Walton was a pioneer in the study of argumentation schemes, both individual
15This account of how humans recognize faces differs from that given in Oliver Sack’s book,
“The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat” [46]. When one of us (PM) wrote to Sacks in 1987 to
contest his account and to propose an alternative, Sacks replied with a suggestion for an experiment
to decide between the two alternative explanations. Only decades later did PM learn that Sacks
suffered from prosopagnosia.
16For instance, every version of Microsoft’s Windows Operating System since the release in 1995




schemes and collectively.17 He told one of us (PM) that he had been led to con-
sider these schemes for pedagogical reasons — to make it easier for his students
to recognize and critically analyze informal arguments. Only later did he realize
that their study could have theoretical and practical implications. His 1996 book
[54] appears to have been his first work looking at multiple schemes, but he had
written earlier books on particular types of informal argument, for example, on Ad
Hominem arguments [52] and Slippery Slope Arguments [53].
Arguments schemes are a form of default reasoning where a claim is posited as
presumptively true or to be endorsed by default. A rational reaction to the claim
may investigate the assumptions being made, implicitly or explicitly, in endorsing the
claim and assess whether or not these assumptions hold in any particular case. We
could consider consideration of the assumptions to be an assessment of the validity of
application of the scheme in a particular case. Endorsing a claim (especially a claim
proposing that an action be executed) may entail commitments to endorsements of
other claims or to other actions. Arguably, a rational decision–maker (one making
decisions based on reasoned grounds) would therefore only endorse the default claim
both knowing these commitments and taking any decision under advisement, i.e.,
informed by that knowledge. Thus, a rational decision–maker would also assess the
commitments that endorsement of a default claim would entail. As well as eliciting
the assumptions behind a presumptive conclusion, critical questions can explore the
existence and nature of such entailments.
Argumentation schemes with their associated critical questions have found ap-
plication in ai, for example in the development of automated argument in practical
reasoning [8], in automated dialogues over commands [9], and in automated selec-
tion of statistical models for data analysis [48]. Many argument schemes involve
default conclusions which are logically fallacious, and so their study has been un-
dertaken in that branch of argumentation theory known as Informal Logic. Even
though logically fallacious they may plan an important role in society, particularly
in situations where information is incomplete, inconsistent or uncertain. As an ex-
ample, Ad Hominem arguments are criticized by most scientists, since they appear
draw conclusions about the content of an argument from personal attributes of the
proponent of that argument. Science, it is often argued, should be an objective
activity, and so Ad Hominem arguments are typically disparaged by scientists. Yet,
these arguments play a great role in legal proceedings, because they allow the court
to assess the testimony of witnesses and of experts. Over time, in most legal juris-
dictions, rules have developed as to when and how such arguments may be made in
considering testimony.
17See [30] for a history of argumentation schemes and related forms of reasoning.
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Another example are epideictic arguments, which involve drawing conclusions
about the substance of claim from the form of its presentation. Although clearly
logically fallacious, there are circumstances where this form of reasoning is rational,
as William Rehg has argued [42]. Indeed, there are circumstances where epideictic
reasoning is also commonplace, as in assessments made by venture capitalists of
potential investment proposals from start-ups. In this situation, potential investors
may have little past experience on which to base an investment decision, and the
start-up may face an uncertain and fast-changing business environment. The mar-
keting plans and financial forecasts of the start-up management team will almost
certainly not prove accurate, and so the team’s ability to modify their plans in the
light of operational experience becomes a better indicator of their potential success
than the contents of the current plans themselves. Such abilities may best be as-
sessed, not by the written plans and forecasts, but by the management team’s ability
to respond to probative questioning from the venture capitalist.
Not only is the use of such logically fallacious informal arguments widespread,
there is a strong argument that modern society could not function without their use.
Philosopher Charles Willard, for instance, has argued [65] that in a society which
depends on complex technology that is too vast and changing too quickly for any
one person, or even a small group of people, to ever master completely, then we all
need to rely on arguments from authority and on assertions made by experts. The
covid-19 pandemic18 that so occupies our current attentions illustrates our society’s
reliance on such arguments with great immediacy. The point is not to avoid such
a reliance, because that is infeasible, but rather to make our reliance as rationally
justified as possible (within the time available in each case) by means of rational
interrogation of the claims of authorities and of experts, and of their supporting
arguments and sub-claims.
Thus, for instance, in the case of covid-19, many governments have relied on
advice from expert epidemiologists. Given a particular claim from a particular expert
epidemiologist, we could interrogate it according to the Argument Scheme from
Expert Opinion that Walton articulated and studied in [55, page 210]. This scheme
was presented as an argument with two premises and a default claim, along with
six critical questions. Using the notation of a later presentation19 of the argument
18For the benefit of any readers who were born after the pandemic, particularly if it has largely
disappeared from the historical record in the interim, we note that this paper was written in the
throes of the second wave, and that the pandemic as a whole greatly disrupted all aspects of life
across the world, including the writing of this paper.
19As a trivial example of the wide-ranging nature of the impact of the pandemic is the fact that
one author (PM) owns a copy of [55] but has not been to his university office, where the book is
located, for 8 months.
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scheme [60], E is an expert in some field of knowledge F comprising a finite collection
of propositions. The argument scheme consists of:
1. Major Premise: Source E is an expert in field F containing proposition A.
2. Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A in field F is true (false).
3. Conclusion: Proposition A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
Walton [55, page 223] proposes six critical questions for this scheme, labelled CQ1
through CQ6, as follows:
CQ1. Expertise Question: How knowledgeable is E as an expert source?
CQ2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in?
CQ3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
CQ4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
CQ5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
CQ6. Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
To these six questions, we would add another:
CQ7. Self-interest Question: Is it the case that E does not stand to gain by our
endorsement of proposition A?
As a simple example of the use of this scheme, consider that Anthony asserts that
wearing a mask is an effective way to limit the spread of the Severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (sars-cov-2) that causes covid-19. Considered through
the lens of the Argument Scheme from Expert Opinion, we might want to check
that we can provide positive answers to the critical questions before we are prepared
to accept Anthony’s argument. In this case we can accept the argument, since
(CQ1) Anthony is a extremely knowledgeable, having been extensively cited; (CQ2)
Anthony is an expert in a relevant field, that of infectious diseases; (CQ3) Anthony
made assertions in [27] implying that wearing a mask was an effective way to limit
the spread of sars-cov-2; (CQ4) we have no knowledge of Anthony lying, so can
consider him a trustworthy source; (CQ5) his advice is consistent with what other
experts, for example those in the World Health Organisation20; (CQ6) Anthony’s
20https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/332293
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assertion is backed by evidence, listed in [27]; and (CQ7) there is nothing to suggest
that Anthony has anything to gain by our endorsement of his claim that wearing a
mask is an effective way to limit the spread sars-cov-2.
Note that in order to accept Anthony’s claim, we need to examine all of the
critical questions. If we cannot give a positive answer to any one of the questions,
the conclusion should not be accepted. For example, consider Donald, who makes
the opposing claim to Anthony, that wearing masks is not helpful in the context of
the covid-19 pandemic. Even if one accepts that Donald is an expert in the field,
the fact (CQ4) that he is known to have repeatedly lied on the matters related to
the pandemic21 means that we cannot answer the “trustworthiness question” in the
affirmative, and hence Donald’s argument claim cannot be accepted.
In the above example, there is only level of analysis. We took the argument,
and applied critical questions to that argument. However, a multilevel analysis may
sometimes be appropriate. Consider Neil, who claims, for example, that during
the pandemic, no more than six people should gather together indoors to limit the
spread of the disease. As an epidemiologist, Neil is an expert on disease transmission,
and when asked for evidence to support his argument (CQ6), would point to the
computational diffusion model that generated the results. In other words, the claim
about the “rule of six” rests on the output of a computational model.
Why should we accept that output? Well, the epidemiologists who developed the
model would claim, in effect, that it is an oracle which, much like an expert, considers
a range of factors that are outside the grasp of most humans. The oracle weighs
these factors and produces a summary that the non-experts can use to guide their
behaviour. Since the computer model is treated as an expert, we might consider the
evidence that it produces for Neil’s claim in the same way that we consider the claim
itself, that is as an instantiation of an Argument from Expert Opinion. If we do this,
then we might want to subject it to a second level of analysis, to check whether neil
is justified in relying on it. If we do so, then, in order to answer the “trustworthiness
question” (CQ4) it might be wise to ask the opinion of professional programmers,
another group of experts part of whose expertise is the ability to establish whether
software is reliable, that is whether the outputs of that software are trustworthy.
When experienced programmers look at models like Neil’s, they usually find they
were built incrementally and with very poor or no software engineering practices.
That is, there is no or little documentation, no standard good development models,
no agreed statement of specifications, no formal design, no rigorous testing of the
21See [11] for a list of Donald’s many lies on the subject between the start of the pandemic and
November 2nd 2020, and [63] for a record of his lies as President. As of September 3rd 2020, the




components, and no independent testing by professionals other than the program-
mers who built the model.22 This might lead us to question the relaibility of the
model, and hence whether Neil’s original claim holds.
In contrast to the situation in computational epidemiology, some disciplines
which regularly use simulation models, such as economics, specialist expertise in-
creasingly exists on how to evaluate such models, for example [32, 38]. Thus we
see an instance of Willard’s argument on the inter-connected complexity of contem-
porary life: evaluation of a statement about the best public policy to reduce the
risk of infection during the pandemic may require, for its resolution, evaluation of
claims about particular computational simulation models in epidemiology, which, in
turn, may require evaluation of claims about software engineering best practice and
their application to the particular epidemiological model; few people if any have the
necessary skills to evaluate all these claims across the different disciplines involved,
from public policy to epidemiology to simulation modeling to software engineering.
2.3 The role of dialogue
A second feature is that evaluation and assessment of explanations might best be
undertaken within the context of a dialogue, between an explainer, either the entity
which generated the explanation or an entity able and willing to answer questions
about the explanation, and an explainee, an entity seeking to assess the explanation,
For human interactions, if one person seeks from another person an explanation
of something, and the two have an appropriate social relationship allowing them
to engage in a conversation of equals,23 then our contemporary western cultural
experience would lead most of us to expect the two entities to engage in a dialogue
involving questions and responses about the explanation. We do not call these
responses “answers” because they may not be intended by the responder to be
answers to a prior question and because, even when so intended, they may not
satisfy the questioner.
The questions may serve a number of purposes: they may seek further clarifica-
22As an example of such analysis, see the anonymous critique a software developer of the code
of the Imperial College covid-19 epidemiological model by published on the Web in May 2020 at:
https://lockdownsceptics.org/code-review-of-fergusons-model/
23Habermas [20] discusses such social relationships. In this sub-section, we are ignoring inter-
actions which are normally adversarial, such as criminal and military interrogations or courtroom
cross-examinations. One of the dialogue types which Walton and Krabbe include in [62] is Eristic
dialogues, which are adversarial interactions where one or both parties give vent to anger or frus-
tration. Even these dialogues have been studied by argumentation theorists, e.g., by Dov Gabbay
and John Woods [17, 18]; this work has potential applications, for instance, in customer service
centre operations.
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tion of the explanation; they may seek clarification regarding a response to a prior
question; they may seek to identify or make explicit any underlying assumptions in
the explanation or in the responses; they may seek to identify consequences of the
explanation or of the response (for example commitments to particular beliefs or ac-
tions entailed by endorsing the explanation or a response); they may seek to expose
internal inconsistencies in the explanation, or in the responses, or in both explana-
tion and responses when considered together; they may seek to contest or argue with
the explanation, or its assumptions or consequences, or those of the responses; and,
as with any linguistic interaction between two or more parties, the questions posed
may seek to clarify previous utterances or concern the operation of the dialogue it-
self, for example, if there is sufficient time to ask further questions. In other words,
this conversation between some person or machine seeking an explanation generated
for an ai system and a person or machine who has proposed such an explanation
could easily take the form of a dialogues involving questions and responses. For
convenience in this paper, let us call these Explanation-Question-Response (eqr)
dialogues.
To enable machines to automatically engage in such eqr dialogues, we need
to define the rules of the dialogue — their formal syntax, their semantics, and
their pragmatics. Although these terms are taken from linguistics, over time they
have come to have subtly different connotations in disciplines other than linguistics,
firstly in mathematical logic, and then in computer science and ai. In particular,
as we discuss in [35], for autonomous computational agents engaged in dialogic
interactions, a formal semantics is needed for the agents (and their human or machine
designers) to be able to verify, as best they can, that different agents engaged in a
dialogue share the same understanding of each other’s utterances and of the dialogue
itself.24 Moreover, having a formal semantics and pragmatics for utterances and
dialogues can greatly facilitate (or hinder) the computational implementation of
interactions. In [35] we discuss these issues at length; here we will briefly mention
each element with respect to eqr dialogues.
Syntax
The rules of syntax for a computational dialogue typically govern the permitted
forms of utterances and the rules applying to their use. An agent communications
language such as acl developed by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
fipa (now ieee fipa) [15], for example, specifies very strictly the form of each of
the 22 permitted utterances, although it has no rules or protocols regarding their
24Michael Wooldridge showed in [66] that a sufficiently clever software agent can always present
to an external observer an insincere representation of its own internal state.
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combination. Computer scientists attempting to use this language for agent commu-
nications quickly realized that more structure was needed, and so developed specific
interaction protocols, for example, for running Dutch auctions [14]. Such protocols,
although well and good for their particular intended purposes, lack generality. What
was needed was a general theory of dialogue which allowed for different types and
purposes of dialogues.
This was found in Doug Walton’s 1995 book with Erik Krabbe, “Commitment
in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning” [62]. This work presented
a classification of human dialogues in terms of three dimensions:
• What the participants each knew before the dialogue commenced;
• What each participant intended to achieve by participating in the the dialogue
(i.e., the goals of each participant); and
• What the goals of the dialogue are.
With these dimensions, Walton and Krabbe identified and analyzed six types of
dialogue: Information-Seeking, Inquiry, Persuasion, Negotiation, Deliberation and
Eristic. This classification and these dialogue types have been quite influential within
ai with computational models being proposed for each of these types (see [35] for a
review of applications). Walton and Krabbe do not claim their list is comprehensive,
and indeed other types have been studied by researchers in ai. In earlier work
[34, 35], we presented a list of the key elements needed for specifying the syntax
rules of a dialogue between computational agents, drawing both on Speech Act
theory from the Philosophy of Argumentation (as does the acl language of ieee
fipa) and on Walton and Krabbe’s classification in [62].
Although very influential in ai, the Walton and Krabbe classification is not
without some challenges. In a context of autonomous agents, one would have to
ask how a dialogue type, an entity without agency, could have goals. At best, “the
goals of the dialogue” might be understood as the maximal subset of shared goals
of the participants for their participation in the interaction, but that would assume
they share any goals. In a multi-agent context, that assumption may not apply. In
other work, one of us identified “the goals of the dialogue” with the set of possible
outcomes of interactions conducted under the rules of that dialogue and used these
sets of outcomes to design an efficient means of storage of dialogue types [40].
Moreover, in any computational system where participating agents may be de-
signed by independent teams of software developers, there is no guarantee that the
stated goals of each participating agent are in fact their real goals. Even without
any insincerity on the part of the participants of their design teams, software agents
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may have buggy code, and so may act contrary to their stated goals.25 For example,
a participant in a dialogue may wish never to a reach a conclusion, or may wish
to delay reaching a conclusion until after some other event has occurred, or may
join an interaction in order to delay or distract another participant, or just to cause
confusion.26
For eqr dialogues, we could conceive the appropriate dialogue type to be a Per-
suasion dialogue, where the Explainer is trying to persuade the Explainee to accept
or endorse the explanation provided by the Explainer. The incorporation of criti-
cal questions, however, may lead us to consider these interactions as Information-
Seeking dialogues (where Explainee is seeking an explanation from Explainer) or
Information-Giving dialogues (where Explainer is providing information in the form
of an explanation about the operations of some ai system to Explainee). Information-
Giving dialogues are not analyzed in the Walton and Krabbe typology [62]. However,
in may applications of eqr dialogues, Explainee may wish to see how well and by
what means Explainer is able to convey an understanding of the operations of the
ai system in this particular case, for this particular decision, and so the dialogue
may be closer in form to the Query dialogues of [12], where questioner wants to hear
and understand, not just a claim itself, but the arguments for the claim.
Semantics
As far as we are aware, Charles Hamblin was the first person to present a semantics
for question–response interactions, in his 1957 PhD thesis [21]. Hamblin’s seman-
tics was based on alternative possible worlds, with different responses corresponding
to certain propositions being true in different possible worlds.27 Hamblin later ex-
panded these ideas in a paper that became well-known in linguistics [22]. The
subject of the semantics of questions and of question–response interactions has since
become a topic of great interest in theoretical linguistics, and there are now several
alternative theories; see Floris Roelofsen’s linguistics encyclopedia entry [45] for a
recent review.
25For the same reason, the consoling assumption of mainstream economists that agents always
act in their own self-interest cannot be made by computer scientists.
26Some of these disruptive behaviours have been observed in industry-wide discussions over new
computer standards [37].
27Hamblin’s PhD, which was submitted in 1956, included one of the earliest instances of possible
worlds semantics, alongside those of Richard Montague (initially in 1955), Carew Meredith and
Arthur Prior (1956), Stig Kanger (1957), A. Bayart (1958, 1959), Saul Kripke (1959, 1962) and
Jaako Hintikka (1962). See [13] for a partial history of possible worlds semantics. Hamblin had
been a student of Karl Popper and Hamblin’s own student Jim MacKenzie argues in [31] that
Hamblin was strongly influenced by the ideas of both Popper and Wittgenstein.
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In this paper we are proposing the use of argumentation schemes and critical
questions for modeling arguments and questions in eqr dialogues. The various se-
mantics for question–response interactions explored in linguistics do not formally
incorporate the structure of argumentation schemes and critical questions. The
critical questions are not randomly asked, but are specific to the presumptive claim
of a specific argumentation scheme, and to its specific (albeit possible implicit) as-
sumptions and its specific potential consequences. We believe this argumentation
theoretic structure is important for understanding (and thus for modeling and au-
tomatically generating) the reasons why particular questions are asked and for the
overall structure of the eqr dialogue in which the questions sit. The semantic frame-
works found in linguistics, because they are not based on an explicit argumentation
theory, seem too coarse for this purpose.
As an example of how a computational semantic structure can incorporate an
explicit philosophy of argument based on argumentation schemes, we mention the
work of Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon in [6]. Their approach used a
framework based on the Alternating-Time Temporal Logic of [2] to create a formal
semantics for the syntax for multi-party practical reasoning presented earlier in
[8]. The last-cited work articulated a framework for dialogues over what actions
to take in some situation (i.e., practical reasoning dialogues) building on Walton’s
Argumentation Scheme for Practical Reasoning in [54]. We believe that a similar
approach would be fruitful for eqr dialogues.
Pragmatics
The pragmatics of utterances and dialogues concerns not their form (the syntax),
nor their relationship to truth or reality (their semantics), but other aspects of their
meaning unrelated to truth. The most common aspect of meaning unrelated to truth
concerns how and when utterances are used, for example: what pre-conditions apply
to their use, and what consequences usually follow from their use. In the English
language, for instance, asking “Do you have the time?” normally results not in an
affirmative “Yes” response if the responder has the time, but in the provision of
the time itself. So part of the meaning of this question is the fact that responders
to the question usually answer another question, “What is the time?”
It makes sense to talk about the pragmatics of dialogues as well as of utterances,
particularly when dialogues are nested, concatenated or interleaved. For example
when participants in a Negotiation dialogue start to enact an Information-Seeking
dialogue, one may ask if this diversion is somehow necessarily pre-determined by
the first dialogue or its contents, or whether it is an appropriate diversion at this
point or elsewhere in the first dialogue, etc; see [34] for a discussion of these issues.
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Although Speech Act theory from the Philosophy of Language, which is focused on
the pragmatics of utterances, has been very influential in the branch of ai devoted
to agent communications, the computational study of pragmatics of utterances and
of dialogues is still only its infancy in ai.28 As an example of such work, our paper
[36] presents a formal game-theoretic semantics for dialogues over actions, in which
the semantics provides a framework for two pragmatic features of speech acts over
actions: firstly, the fact that in modern western cultures, such speech often require
acceptance by the intended recipient (so-called “uptake”) before such utterances
create any action commitments; and secondly, that once a commitment is incurred,
the rights of revocation of that commitment may no longer lie with with the person
who made the utterance.
At first glance, uptake and revocation may be considered unimportant for eqr
dialogues because these dialogues do not appear to be concerned with actions. How-
ever, insofar that explanations for decisions made or recommended by ai systems
do involve actions, whether these actions are before, alongside, or subsequent to the
operation of the ai system, these two considerations will be important. For instance,
if future regulations or laws governing ai systems require that any implementation
of an automated ai decision-system includes both an explanation of how the deci-
sion was reached for the intended subject of the decision and also an endorsement
(i.e., uptake) of that explanation by the subject (acting as an explainee) before any
execution of the decision, then these two pragmatic aspects will be crucially im-
portant. In the developed world we now have several decades of experience asking
medical patients for their informed consent before implementing medical procedures
and treatments, so modeling and implementing these aspects may well be relatively
straightforward.29
3 The Nosenko Case
The case of Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet citizen who defected to the USA on 4 February
1964, is instructive. Nosenko arrived claiming be employed by the USSR Komitet
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) and to have first-hand knowledge of the pe-
riod in which Lee Harvey Oswald, President Kennedy’s assassin, spent as a defector
in the USSR, including having seen his KGB files. Based on this knowledge, Nosenko
claimed that the USSR had not used Oswald to assassinate Kennedy and indeed that
the KGB had played no role in his death.
Opinion was strongly divided within the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
28Arguably, it may only be in its infancy in Linguistics also.
29Although it is not clear that it will be; see [49] for a critique of these practices in medicine.
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as to whether Nosenko was a genuine defector or a Soviet plant, intending with
his defection to deceive the CIA in some way or simply to cause confusion.30 He
apparently had detailed knowledge of some aspects of KGB operations, but lacked
knowledge of others (such as KGB office and human resource procedures). Over
the course of the seven years following his defection, management at CIA went
through periods of apparent strong belief in Nosenko’s sincerity, and periods of
apparent strong disbelief. In the former periods, Nosenko was treated well, given
free accommodation and even given money. In the latter periods, he was held in
solitary confinement and interrogated with ferocity. Among the strongest sceptics
of Nosenko’s sincerity was the long-term CIA Chief of Counterintelligence, James J.
Angleton.31
Eventually, CIA leadership in 1969 officially accepted Nosenko as genuine, and
he was put on the payroll as a consultant, helping to train CIA officers, for example.
As late as 2007, however, Tennent Bagley, a CIA officer who had been involved
in the case from the start, published a detailed account arguing for the case that
Nosenko was indeed a plant [10]. Nosenko died in 2008.
A key first question for the CIA was thus whether or not to believe Nosenko
was genuine. If he was genuine, then so too presumably were his claims about the
files he had seen on Oswald, and the denial of Soviet involvement in the Kennedy
assassination. But this first question was not the only important question. A second
key question, independent of the first, was what should CIA let the Soviets believe
was their (the CIA’s) answer to the first question. In other words, even if CIA
believed (or did not believe) Nosenko, what should they allow the KGB to know —
that they did believe him or that they did not?
These two questions arise in any case of a defector, and indeed the KGB would
have faced the same two questions in reverse when Oswald had defected to the USSR
in 1959; likewise, the CIA would have faced them again when Oswald returned to
30That intelligence agencies on both sides of the Cold War sought to create confusion in their
opponents is well-attested, e.g., see [44]. As an example in the reverse direction to the Nosenko
case, Lukes has argued [29] that the show trial and execution of Deputy Prime Minister and for-
mer Communist Party General-Secretary Rudolf Slánský and other leading Government officials in
Czechoslovakia in 1952 was facilitated by a western intelligence operation which sent false compro-
mising letters to leading party members as part of an operation to sow confusion in Czechoslovakia.
A book by journalist Stewart Steven [50] claimed that all the show trials across the region in the late
1940s and early 1950s were the result of a sophisticated western intelligence effort, called Operation
Splinter, to cause division between the ruling communist parties in the the USSR and those in its
Eastern European satellites; however, the claims of the book may be false, and the publication of
the book in 1974 may itself have been a disinformation effort intended to cause confusion.
31A story based on the Nosenko case features in a 2006 film by Robert de Niro about the life of
Angleton, The Good Shepherd.
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the USA in 1962.32 The answers to these questions had a special resonance in this
case because of the Kennedy assassination aspect. For the CIA to lead the KGB
to believe that the CIA doubted the sincerity of Nosenko would have then led the
KGB to believe that the CIA doubted Nosenko’s claims of no Soviet involvement
in Kennedy’s assassination. Even if the CIA did doubt those claims, was it in the
interests of the CIA (or the USA) for the KGB to think that the CIA may consider
the Soviets responsible for the assassination? While enquiries were still ongoing —
the Warren Commission into the assassination only reported in September 1964 —
it would have behooved the CIA to not allow a clear indication of its conclusion to
the first question to be communicated to the USSR, even if a determination had
been reached.
Two further complications arise here. One is that the evidence in this case, both
that from questioning Nosenko and that from other information, was not clear cut.33
If the KGB intended to sow confusion with a false defector, then these inconsistencies
may well have been deliberate. On the other hand, even if not deliberate and
Nosenko sincere, the KGB may also have known about the inconsistencies. Hence, if
CIA wanted to convince KGB that their determination about Nosenko’s sincerity was
itself sincere, then they could not reach that determination (or pretend to reach that
determination) too quickly or readily. In other words, the seven-year back-and-forth
CIA effort to decide what to think about Nosenko may itself have been a feint, to
convince the KGB that the final conclusion was reached with difficulty, and was thus
itself sincere.34 Why that would be necessary is because of the second complication:
In any military conflict, it is usually very difficult to communicate a message to your
enemy and have them believe it straight away; they will naturally be suspicious of
any message you send them directly. For this reason, intelligence agencies may not
initially reveal or expel agents of foreign powers they learn are working inside them,
because such agents can be useful for the communication of messages to the enemy
which the enemy are more likely to believe than direct communications.35
In the Nosenko case then, we have a Nosenko-explainer answering questions from
32The fact that the USSR accepted Oswald as a defector but sent him to the relative isolation of
factory work in Minsk, may have been an indication of a lack of trust by the KGB in his sincerity.
Similarly, the fact that Oswald does not appear to have faced any impediment to his return to the
USA, with the US Embassy in Moscow even lending him money for the fare, despite his earlier
renunciation of his US citizenship and public defection to the USSR, would have led some in the
KGB to conclude that his first defection had not been genuine, i.e., that he had been a US plant
(although not necessarily working for the CIA).
33As Bagley shows in [10].
34The difficulty of computational modeling of feints in human interactions is discussed in [33].
35Some people believe this is one reason why the UK intelligence agencies were slow to expose
the Cambridge spies in the 1940s and 1950s.
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a CIA-explainee. The explainer may have been seeking to deceive the explainee, and
the explainee would have tried to detect such deception. Even if deception by the
explainer existed and was discovered by the explainee, the explainee may not have
wished to inform explainer Nosenko of this. The CIA-explainee may also have wished
to deceive the USSR (specifically the KGB) about whether or not they believed the
explanation given by explainer Nosenko. Hence, the explainee’s actions, including
the environment of the interrogations (e.g., the use of solitary confinement), the
lines of questioning adopted, and the order and content of specific questions, may
have been part of a larger deception effort aimed at the KGB. Even Bagley’s late
book [10] may have been part of some greater deception effort.
The purpose of this example is to show the difficulty of accounting for all relevant
factors and considerations in any computational modeling of explanation dialogues.
Both the explainer and explainee may have multiple objectives or agendas in which
the Explanation-Question-Response dialogue plays only a small part. These objec-
tives may be in conflict with one another, and may change in the course of the
interaction. To achieve particular objectives, either or both the parties may seek to
deceive the other, and to deceive external entities who are not parties to the eqr
dialogue.
4 Conclusions
Alongside the recent rise to prominence of Machine Learning and Deep Learning
within AI has arisen the associated challenge of automatically generating explana-
tions for how automated decision-systems reach the conclusions they do. This chal-
lenge is driven by strong pressure from governments and industry regulators in many
sectors of the economy to make automated decision-systems and recommendation-
systems transparent and fair. For most model-driven ai systems, such as rule-
based expert systems, generating explanations for automated decisions is relatively
straightforward. For many machine learning and deep learning systems, this task is
not. In either case, creating automated explanations leads to a subsequent research
challenge: How may we analyze and assess these explanations, and how may we
undertake this task automatically?
In this paper, we have outlined an approach to the challenge of automated as-
sessment of explanations drawing on two areas of the philosophy of argumentation to
which Doug Walton made important contributions: the study of argument schemes
and their associated critical questions, and the classification of types of dialogue he
developed with Erik Krabbe. Both these areas have had strong influence in Artificial
Intelligence over the last quarter century, particularly in the area known as Agent
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Communications. This area seeks to enable automated communications between au-
tonomous intelligent software agents, in other words automated machine-to-machine
communications.
In presenting the approach in this paper we have not considered other work of
Walton’s which is relevant, in particular his study of explanation dialogues, e.g.,
[56, 57, 58, 59]. We have also not yet considered aspects highlighted by the Nosenko
case in Section 3, such as the broader intentions of the participants and the possi-
bility of deception by either or both of Explainer and Explainee. Despite the study
of lies, deception and equivocation having a long history in philosophy and theol-
ogy, computational models of these phenomena are only just emerging, e.g., [47].
Applying these various elements to this challenging problem domain remains future
work.
5 Memories of DW
SP: Before I sat down to write this, I thought my first memory of Doug was from
the 1996 Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning (FAPR) conference in Bonn which
(and this I am sure about) was when I first came across the Informal Logic school
of work on argumentation. I, like a number of the other attendees at the conference,
came to work on logic and argumentation through the ai tradition, and were wholly,
and embarrassingly, unaware of this other tradition. When I started to write this, I
thought I would check that Doug was there and revisit what he presented. However,
I can find no record of his presence — neither in the proceedings nor in any of the
material that is now online36. As a result, I am no longer sure whether I know Doug
from FAPR, or that I became aware of his work around this time though the work of
people like Chris Reed, who was quick to connect work on argumentation in ai with
that from philosophy. Ultimately, though, it doesn’t matter where I first met Doug.
What is important, is that he became a near ubiquitous presence in my academic
life (and I mean that in a good way). Very quickly Doug’s work — initially that on
dialogue, subsequently that on argument schemes — became pretty central to a lot
of what I work on, and Doug himself turned out to attend many of the events that
I went to. He was always interesting to listen to, and though I know some folk who
found some of his examples to be a little, shall we say “traditional”, I always found
him to be both courteous and respectful of everyone I saw him interact with. He
was always generous with his time, and in that, and his astonishing productivity, I
have long thought of him as a role model, and will continue to do so.
36Of course, this was still in the dark ages pre Web-2.0, and, as a result, very little of the
conference was ever published online.
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PM: I first met Doug in 2000 at Pitlochry in Scotland, at the week-long Ar-
gumentation and Computation Symposium which Chris Reed and Tim Norman
organized for philosophers of argumentation to meet computer scientists, held at
Bonskeid House.37 Doug was friendly and courteous, and – I say this as an Aus-
tralian and intending it as a compliment – very Canadian. I subsequently met him
frequently at various conferences and workshops and he was always the same. He
was also very helpful to me in providing memories of Charles Hamblin, an Australian
philosopher of argumentation and pioneer of computer science, whom he had met
and had worked with.
I recall an incident at a workshop held in Bologna, Italy at the 10th International
Conference on ai and Law, held at Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna,
in 2005. A student gave a presentation to the workshop which included a discussion
of the model of dialogues in Walton and Krabbe [62]. Unknown to the presenter,
Doug was sitting in the front row of the audience. Someone asked a question about
the dialogue model, to which the presenter responded with a statement that he did
not know the answer, and that only the authors of the book would know the answer.
Members of the audience who knew Doug laughed, and someone said, “Well, let’s
ask the author himself!” Doug responded quite humbly, and to the great surprise of
the presenter.
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